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1989 air battle near Tobruk
Battle of Sirte}} | combatant2 = United States | commander1 = Muammar Gaddafi | commander2 = Ronald Reagan | strength1 = 2 MiG-23 Floggers | strength2 = 2 F-14A Tomcats | casualties1 = 2 aircraft destroyed | casualties2 = None | campaignbox = }} On 4 January 1989, two United States Navy F-14 Tomcats shot down two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers which the Americans believed were attempting to engage them, as had happened eight years prior during the Gulf of Sidra incident, in 1981. The engagement took place over the Mediterranean Sea about north of Tobruk, Libya.Stanik 2003, p.229. Background In 1973, Libya claimed much of the Gulf of Sidra as its territorial waters and subsequently declared a "line of death", the crossing of which would invite a military response. The United States challenged Libya's territorial claims which led to military hostilities in August 1981 and March 1986. A terrorist attack which killed two American soldiers on 5 April 1986 was linked to Libya and prompted the U.S. to carry out retaliatory air strikes against targets within Libya ten days later. Attempts by Libya to obtain weapons of mass destruction were of great concern to U.S. President Ronald Reagan's Administration since it recognized Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism.Kaplan, Eben. "How Libya Got Off the List." Council on Foreign Relations, 16 October 2007. Retrieved: 4 August 2017. Tensions between Libya and the U.S. were high after the latter accused the former of building a chemical weapons plant near Rabta in the fall of 1988.Stanik 2003, p.230. During a December 1988 press interview, Reagan indicated there was the potential for military action to destroy the plant.Pear, Robert. "U.S. Downs 2 Libyan Fighters, Citing Their 'Hostile Intent'; Chemical Plant Link Denied." New York Times, 5 January 1989. Retrieved: 5 August 2017. The possibility of a U.S. attack caused Libya to increase its air defenses around Rabta and its state of military readiness throughout the country.Trainor, Bernard E. "Bonus to U.S. From Clash: Intelligence." New York Times, 6 January 1989. Retrieved: 8 August 2017. Engagement On the morning of 4 January 1989, the was sailing toward the eastern Mediterranean Sea for a scheduled port visit to Haifa, Israel.Stanik 2003, p.228. The aircraft carrier was more than north of Libya and had aircraft operating roughly north of the country.Stanik 2003, p.230.Gillcrist 1994, p.154. Aircraft from the Kennedy included several flights of A-6 Intruders on exercises south of Crete, two pairs of F-14 Tomcats from VF-14 and VF-32 conducting combat air patrols, and an E-2 Hawkeye from VAW-126 providing airborne early warning and control.Gillcrist 1994, p.154. The easternmost combat air patrol station was provided by two F-14s from VF-32 with aircraft call signs Gypsy 207 (crewed by Commander Joseph Bernard Connelly and Commander Leo F. Enwright in Bureau Number 159610) and Gypsy 202 (crewed by Lieutenant Herman C. Cook III and Lieutenant Commander Steven Patrick Collins in Bureau Number 159437).Stanik 2003, p.228. Although the Kennedy Battle Group was not operating within the contentious Gulf of Sidra and was away from Rabta, the battle group commander believed Libyan concerns of a U.S. attack increased the likelihood of a confrontation.Gillcrist 1994, p.154.Stanik 2003, p.231. The American air crews were given a special brief by the battle group commander which emphasized their rules of engagement due to the carrier's proximity to Libya.Gillcrist 1994, p.154. At 11:55 local time, the E-2 detected two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers take off from Al Bumbah airfield, near Tobruk, and observed them heading north toward the battle group. The F-14s from VF-32 were directed to intercept the MiG-23s, while the F-14s from VF-14 covered the A-6s as they departed to the north.Gillcrist 1994, p.155. Using their onboard radars, the intercepting F-14s began tracking the MiG-23s when the Libyan aircraft were away, at an altitude of , and traveling at a speed of . Unlike some previous aerial encounters, where Libyan pilots were instructed to turn back after detecting an F-14's radar signal sweep their aircraft, the MiG-23s continued to close in on the American fighters with a head-on approach.Wilson, George C. "Secretly Acquired MiGs Aided Navy Pilots In Libya Combat." Washington Post, 13 January 1989. Retrieved: 8 August 2017. As both pairs of aircraft converged, the E-2 and other U.S. eavesdropping assets in the area monitored radio communications between the Libyan aircraft and their ground controllers. The Americans listened to the MiG-23s receive guidance to intercept the F-14s from ground controllers at a radar station in Al Bumbah. This radar station was one of several that were activated along the Libyan coast to support the MiG-23s. At 11:58, the F-14s made a left turn, away from the MiG-23s, to initiate a standard intercept.Stanik 2003, p.229.Halloran, Richard. "U.S. Says Tape Shows Missiles On a Libyan Jet." The New York Times, 6 January 1989. Retrieved: 8 August 2017.Rosenthal, Andrew. Defends Tactics of Pilots Off Libya." The New York Times,''11 January 1989. Retrieved: 8 August 2017. Seven seconds later, the MiG-23s turned back into the American fighters for another head-on approach and were descending in altitude. At this point, the F-14 crews began employing tactics which would reduce the effectiveness of the MiG-23s' radars and the 12-mile-range AA-7 Apex missiles they were potentially carrying. The American aircraft started descending from to to fly lower than the Libyan fighters. The drop in altitude was meant to prevent the MiG-23s from detecting the F-14s by using ocean clutter to confuse their onboard radars. The American pilots executed another left turn away from the Libyan aircraft during the descent. Moments after the F-14s created a 30 degree offset, the MiG-23s turned to place themselves back into a collision course and accelerated to . The air warfare commander on the ''Kennedy gave the American air crews the authority to fire if they believed the MiG-23s were hostile.Gillcrist 1994, p.154. The F-14s turned away from the approaching MiG-23s two more times, and each time, the American air crews saw the Libyan aircraft turn back toward them for a head-on approach. At 12:00:53, the Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) in the lead F-14, Commander Leo Enwright in Gypsy 207, ordered the arming of the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on the American fighters, after what he determined was the fifth time the Libyan aircraft turned back toward him. The American air crews armed their weapons when the opposing aircraft were less than away and closing in on each other at a rate of }. At a distance of about , the lead F-14 pilot, Commander Joseph Connelly, made a radio call to the carrier group's air warfare commander to see if there was any additional information in regard to the MiG-23s. There was no response to his call. At 12:01:20 and a range of , Enwright fired an AIM-7; he surprised Connelly, who did not expect to see a missile accelerate away from his aircraft. The missile failed to track toward its target. At about 10 nautical miles (19 km), Enwright launched a second AIM-7, but it also failed to hit its target. The MiG-23s continued to fly directly toward the American fighters at . The F-14s executed a defensive split, where both aircraft made turns in opposite directions. Both Libyan fighters turned left to pursue the second F-14, Gypsy 202. Connelly prepared Gypsy 207 for a right turn to get behind the MiG-23s as they went after the other American fighter. With the MiG-23s pointed directly at him, Lieutenant Commander Steven Collins, the RIO in Gypsy 202, fired a third AIM-7 from roughly five miles (8 km) away and downed one of the Libyan aircraft. After executing a sharp right turn, Gypsy 207 gained a position in the rear quadrant of the final MiG-23. As the Libyan fighter was turning left and at distance of one and a half miles (2.4 km), Connelly fired an AIM-9 missile which downed its target. The time was 12:02:36 when the last MiG-23 was hit by the AIM-9. The F-14s descended to several hundred feet in altitude and departed at high speed back to the carrier group. The Libyan pilots were both seen to successfully eject and parachute into the sea, but it is not known whether the Libyan Air Force was able to successfully recover them. Aftermath The following day, Libya accused the U.S. of attacking two unarmed reconnaissance planes which were on a routine mission over international waters. Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, called for a United Nations emergency session to take up the incident.Stanik 2003, p.230. The U.S. claimed the American air crews acted in self defense due to demonstrations of hostile intent by the Libyan aircraft. Two days after the engagement, the Pentagon released photographs taken from the videotapes on the F-14s which, according to U.S. naval intelligence analysts, showed the lead MiG-23 armed with two AA-7 Apex missiles and two AA-8 Aphid missiles.Stanik 2003, p.230. The AA-7 can be either a semi-active radar-homing missile or an infrared-homing (heat-seeking) missile, and it can be fired at another aircraft from head-on. The imagery was used to prove the Libyan fighters were armed and helped support the U.S. position that the MiG-23s were hostile. It is not known for sure what the actual intent was for the Libyan aircraft on 4 January.Stanik 2003, p.231. Gaddafi could have believed the U.S. was preparing for an attack on the chemical facility in Rabta and ordered his military to see if the aircraft offshore were bombers bound for targets in Libya. The possible reasons for the MiG-23s' flight profile range from a deliberate attack against the battle group to a radio breakdown with ground controllers which led to the Libyan fighters merging with the F-14s. Details released three months after the incident revealed the MiG-23s never turned on their onboard radars which were needed to guide their AA-7 missiles at maximum range. The turns by the Libyan pilots prior to the first missile launch by the F-14s were considered too slight to be deemed hostile according to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin.Wilson, George C. Despite New Details, Libyan MiG Incident Is Still Puzzling." The Washington Post,''26 March 1989. Retrieved: 13 August 2017. Despite these findings, Aspin said the self defense claim by the U.S. was still justified due to the continued acceleration of the MiG-23s as they closed the distance with the F-14s, and because Libya had a history of firing first. Legacy F-14 Tomcat BuNos ''159437, 159610 At the request of the National Air and Space Museum, the U.S. Navy provided BuNo 159610 to its Udvar-Hazy location near Dulles International Airport. Although Tomcat BuNo 159610 downed the Libyan MiG-23 as a VF-32 F-14A model Tomcat, it returned from that deployment and was entered into the F-14D re-manufacture program and served later in a precision strike role as a VF-31 F-14D®. On September 30, 2006, it was formally unveiled to the public with Captain Connelly and Captain Enwright, both now retired, on the podium as honored guests. , BuNo 159437 is still resting at the Aircraft Maintenance and Restoration Group (AMARG) facility at Davis-Monthan AFB. This aircraft is one of six F-14s currently remaining in the AMARG complex and has not been scrapped due to impending museum placement. If BuNo 159437 becomes a museum exhibit, it is likely to be placed on once the ship becomes a museum itself. See also * 1986 United States bombing of Libya * Action in the Gulf of Sidra (1986) Naval battle between Libyan and U.S. forces * Gulf of Sidra incident (1981), U.S.–Libyan air engagement over territorial claim * Hainan Island incident – an incident involving aircraft between the U.S. and China * Operation Odyssey Dawn * Pan Am Flight 103 * Ouadi Doum air raid References Citations Bibliography * Gillcrest, Paul T. Tomcat!: The Grumman F-14 Story. Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. 1994. * Stanik, Joseph T. El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003. External links *Brief description of the incident *January 16, 1989 Time Europe story, with details of the radio broadcasts and times. *Air aces record *VF-32 photo gallery *Audio recording of the engagement *Libyan Wars, 1980–89, Part 6 — Chemical Reaction, Tom Cooper. *video footage of the incident Category:Conflicts in 1989 Category:Gulf of Sidra Category:Cold War military history of the United States Category:1989 in the United States Category:1989 in Libya Category:Air-to-air combat operations and battles Category:20th-century aircraft shootdown incidents Category:Military history of Libya Category:Libya–United States military relations Category:Aviation accidents and incidents in 1989 Category:Mediterranean Sea Category:January 1989 events